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Abstract
On-device machine learning (ML) is quickly gaining
popularity among mobile apps. It allows offline model
inference while preserving user privacy. However, ML models,
considered as core intellectual properties of model owners,
are now stored on billions of untrusted devices and subject to
potential thefts. Leaked models can cause both severe financial
loss and security consequences.
This paper presents the first empirical study of ML model
protection on mobile devices. Our study aims to answer three
open questions with quantitative evidence: How widely is
model protection used in apps? How robust are existing model
protection techniques? How much can (stolen) models cost? To
that end, we built a simple app analysis pipeline and analyzed
46,753 popular apps collected from the US and Chinese app
markets. We identified 1,468 ML apps spanning all popular app
categories. We found that, alarmingly, 41% of ML apps do not
protect their models at all, which can be trivially stolen from
app packages. Even for those apps that use model protection
or encryption, we were able to extract the models from 66%
of them via unsophisticated dynamic analysis techniques. The
extracted models are mostly commercial products and used for
face recognition, liveness detection, ID/bank card recognition,
and malware detection. We quantitatively estimated the
potential financial impact of a leaked model, which can
amount to millions of dollars for different stakeholders.
Our study reveals that on-device models are currently at
high risk of being leaked; attackers are highly motivated to
steal such models. Drawn from our large-scale study, we report
our insights into this emerging security problem and discuss
the technical challenges, hoping to inspire future research on
robust and practical model protection for mobile devices.
1 Introduction
Mobile app developers have been quickly adopting on-device
machine learning (ML) techniques to provide artificial intelli-
gence (AI) features, such as facial recognition, augmented/vir-
tual reality, image processing, voice assistant, etc. This trend
is now boosted by new AI chips available in the latest smart-
phones [1], such as Apple’s Bionic neural engine, Huawei’s
neural processing unit, and Qualcomm’s AI-optimized SoCs.
Compared to performing ML tasks in the cloud or on the
server side, on-device ML (mostly model inference) offers
unique benefits desirable for mobile users as well as app
developers. For example, it avoids sending (private) user
data to the cloud and does not require network connection or
consume much mobile data. For app developers or ML solution
providers, on-device ML greatly reduces the computation load
on their servers.
On-device ML inference inevitably stores ML models
locally on user devices, which however creates a new security
challenge. Commercial ML models used in apps are often part
of the core intellectual property (IP) of vendors. Such models
may fall victim to theft or abuse, if not sufficiently protected.
In fact, on-device ML makes model protection much more
challenging than server-side ML because models are now
stored on user devices, which are fundamentally untrustworthy
and may leak models to curious or malicious parties.
The consequences of model leakage are quite severe. First,
with a leaked model goes away the research and development
investment made by the model owner, which often includes
human, data, and computing costs. Second, when a proprietary
model is obtained by unethical competitors, the model
owner loses the competitive edge or pricing advantage for its
products, causing further financial loss. Third, a leaked model
facilitates malicious actors to find adversarial inputs to bypass
or confuse the ML systems that use the model, which can lead
to not only reputation damages to the vendor but also critical
failures in their products (e.g., fingerprint recognition bypass).
This paper presents the first large-scale study of ML model
protection and theft on mobile devices. Our study aims to
shed lights on the lesser understood risks and costs of model
leakage/theft in the context of on-device ML. We present
our study that answers the following questions with ample
empirical evidence and observations.
• Q1: How widely is model protection used in apps?
• Q2: How robust are existing model protection tech-
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niques?
• Q3: How much can (stolen) models cost?
To answer these questions, we collected 46,753 trending
Android apps from the US and the Chinese app markets. To
answer Q1, we built a simple and automatic pipeline to first
identify the ML models and SDK/frameworks used in an app,
and then detect if the ML models are encrypted. Among all
the collected apps, we found 1,468 apps that use on-device
ML, and 602 (41%) of them do not protect their ML models
at all (i.e., models are stored in plaintext form on devices).
Most of these apps have high installation counts (greater than
10M) and span the top-ten app categories, which underlines
the limited awareness of model thefts and the need for model
protection among app developers.
To answer Q2, for the encrypted models, we dynamically
run the corresponding apps and built an automatic pipeline to
identify and extract the decrypted ML models from memory.
This pipeline represents an unsophisticated model theft attack
that an adversary can realistically launch on her own device.
We found that the same protected models can be reused/shared
by multiple apps, and a set of 18 unique models extracted
from our dynamic analysis can affect 347 apps (43% of all the
apps with protected models). These apps cover a wide range
of ML frameworks, including TensorFlow, TFLite, Caffe,
SenseTime, Baidu, Face++, etc. They use ML for various
purposes, including face tracking, liveness detection, OCR,
ID card and bank card recognition, photo processing, and even
malware detection.
We also observed some interesting cases where a few model
owners did extra to protect their models, such as encrypting
both code and model files, encrypting model files multiple
times, or encrypting feature vectors. Despite the efforts, these
models can be successfully extracted in memory in plaintext.
These cases indicate that model owners or app developers start
realizing the risk of model thefts but no standard and robust
model protection technique exists, which echos the urgent
need for research into on-device model protection.
Finally, to answer Q3, we present an analysis on the financial
impact of model leakage on the stakeholders, including app
developers and model providers. We identify three major
impact sources: the research and development investment
on ML models, the financial loss due to competition, and
the financial loss due to model evasion. We studied several
representative apps and found that the potential financial loss
can be as high as millions of dollars, depending on the app
revenue and the nature of the models.
By performing the large-scale study and finding answers
to the three questions, we intend to raise the awareness of the
model leak/theft risks, which apps using on-device ML are
facing even if models are encrypted. Our study shows that the
risks are realistic due to absent or weak protection of on-device
models. It also shows that attackers are not only technically
able to, but also highly motivated to steal or abuse on-device
ML models. We share our insights and call for future research
to address this emerging security problem.
In summary, the contributions of our research are:
• We apply our analysis pipeline on 46,753 Android apps
collected from US and Chinese app markets. We found
that among the 1,468 apps using on-device ML, 41% do
not have any protection on their ML models. For those do,
66% of them still leak their models to an unsophisticated
runtime attack.
• We provide a quantified estimate on the financial impact
of model leakage based on case studies. We show that
the financial loss caused by a stolen model can be as high
as millions of dollars, indicating tremendous incentives
for attackers.
• Our work calls for research on robust protection
mechanisms for ML models on mobile devices. We share
our insights gained during the study to inform and assist
future work on this topic.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 introduces the background knowledge about on-device
ML. Section 3 presents an overview of our analysis pipeline.
Sections 4, 5, and 6 answers the questions Q1, Q2, and Q3,
respectively. Section 7 discusses the current model protection
practices and effectiveness, the research insights and the
limitations of our analysis. Section 8 surveys the related work
and Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Background
The Trend of On-device Machine Learning: Currently,
there are two ways for mobile apps to use ML: cloud-based and
on-device. In cloud-based ML, apps send requests to a cloud
server, where the ML inference is performed, and then retrieve
the results. The drawbacks include requiring constant network
connections, unsuitable for real-time ML tasks (e.g., live object
detection), and needing raw user data uploaded to the server.
Recently, on-device ML inference is quickly gaining popular-
ity thanks to the availability of hardware accelerators on mobile
devices and the the ML frameworks optimized for mobile apps.
On-device ML avoids the aforementioned drawbacks of cloud-
based ML. It works without network connections, performs
well in real-time tasks, and seldom needs to send (private) user
data off the device. However, with ML inference tasks and ML
models moved from cloud to user devices, on-device ML raises
a new security challenge to model owners and ML service
providers: how to protect the valuable and proprietary ML mod-
els now stored and used on user devices that cannot be trusted.
The Delivery and Protection of On-device Models :
Typically, on-device ML models are trained by app devel-
opers or ML service providers on servers with rich computing
resources (e.g., GPU clusters and large storage servers).
Trained models are shipped with app installation packages. A
model can also be downloaded separately after app installation
to reduce the app package size. Model inference is performed
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Figure 1: Overview of Static-Dynamic App Analysis Pipeline
by apps on user devices, which relies on model files and ML
frameworks (or SDKs). To protect on-device models, some
developers encrypt/obfuscate them, or compile them into app
code and ship them as stripped binaries [7, 25]. However, such
techniques only make it difficult to reverse a model, rather
than strictly preventing a model from being stolen or reused.
On-device Machine Learning Frameworks: There are tens
of popular ML frameworks, such as Google TensorFlow and
TensorFlow Lite [26], Facebook PyTorch and Caffe2 [5],
Tencent NCNN [25], and Apple Core ML [8]. Among these
frameworks, TensorFlow Lite, Caffe2, NCNN and Core
ML are particularly optimized for mobile apps. Different
frameworks use different file formats for storing ML models
on devices, including ProtoBuf (.pb, .pbtxt), FlatBuffer (.tflite),
MessagePack (.model), pickle (.pkl), Thrift (.thrift), etc. To mit-
igate model reverse engineering and leakage, some companies
developed customized or proprietary model formats [46, 54].
On-device Machine Learning Solution Providers: For
cost efficiency and service quality, app developers often use
third-party ML solutions, rather than training their own models
or maintaining in-house ML development teams. The popular
providers of ML solutions and services include Face++ [13]
and SenseTime [28], which sell offline SDKs (including on-
device models) that offer facial recognition, voice recognition,
liveness detection, image processing, Optical Character Recog-
nition (OCR), and other ML functionalities. By purchasing
a license, app developers can include such SDKs in their apps
and use the ML functionalities as black-boxes. ML solution
providers are more motivated to protect their models because
model leakage may severely damage their business [28].
3 Analysis Overview
On-device ML is quickly being adopted by apps, while its
security implications on model/app owners remain largely
unknown. Especially, the threats of model thefts and possible
ways to protect models have not been sufficiently studied.
This paper aims to shed lights on this issue by conducting a
large-scale study and providing quantified answers to three
questions: How widely is model protection used in apps? (§4)
How robust are existing model protection techniques? (§5)
How much can (stolen) models cost? (§6)
To answer these questions, we built a static-dynamic app
analysis pipeline. We note that this pipeline and the analysis
techniques are kept simple intentionally and are not part of
the research contributions of this work. The goal of our study
is to understand how easy or realistic it is to leak or steal ML
models from mobile apps, rather than demonstrating novel or
sophisticated app analysis and reverse-engineering techniques.
Our analysis pipeline represents what a knowledgeable yet not
extremely skilled attacker can already achieve when trying to
steal ML models from existing apps. Therefore, our analysis
result gives the lower bound of (or a conservative estimate on)
how severe the model leak problem currently is.
The workflow of our analysis is depicted in Figure1. Apps
first go through the static analyzer, ModelXRay, which detects
the use of on-device ML and examines the model protection,
if any, adopted by the app. For apps with encrypted models,
the pipeline automatically generates the analysis scripts and
send them to the dynamic analyzer, ModelXtractor, which
performs a non-sophisticated form of in-memory extraction
of model representations. ModelXtractor represents a realistic
attacker who attempts to steal the ML models from an app
installed on her own phone. Models extracted this way are in
plaintext formats, even though they exist in encrypted forms
in the device storage or the app packages. Our evaluation
of ModelXRay and ModelXtractor (§4.3 and §5.3) shows
that they are highly accurate for our use, despite the simple
analysis techniques. We report our findings and insights drawn
from the large-scale analysis results produced by ModelXRay
and ModelXtractor in §4.4 and §5.4, respectively.
We identified three possible financial impacts of model leak-
ages: the Research & Development(R&D) cost, the financial
loss to competition, and the financial loss to model evasion. We
built an estimation framework and used public data from the
Internet to estimate the financial loss of model leakage (§6).
4 Q1: How Widely Is Model Protection Used
in Apps?
4.1 Android App Collection
We collect apps from three Android app markets: Google Play,
Tencent My App, and 360 Mobile Assistant. They are the lead-
ing Android app stores in the US and China [29]. We download
the apps labeled TRENDING and NEW across all 55 categories
from Google Play (12,711), and all recently updated apps from
Tencent My App (2,192) and 360 Mobile Assistant (31,850).
4.2 Methodology of ModelXRay
ModelXRay statically detects if an app uses on-device ML
and whether or not its models are protected or encrypted.
ModelXRay is simple by design and adopts a best-effort
detection strategy that errs on the side of soundness (i.e.,
low false positives), which is sufficient for our purpose of
analyzing model leakage.
The workflow of ModelXRay is shown in Figure 2. For a
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Figure 2: Identify Encrypted Models with ModelXRay
ModelXRay extracts an app’s asset files and
libraries from the APK file, analyzes the native libraries and asset files to identify ML frameworks, SDK libraries and model files. Then it applies
model filters combining file sizes, file suffixes and ML libraries to reduce false positives and use entropy analysis to identify encrypted models.
given app, ModelXRay disassembles the APK file and extracts
the app asset files and the native libraries. Next, it identifies
the ML libraries/frameworks and the model files as follows:
ML Frameworks and SDK Libraries: On-device model
inference always use native ML libraries for performance
reasons. Inspired by Xu’s work [54], we use keyword searching
in binaries for identifying native ML libraries. ModelXRay
supports a configurable dictionary that maps keywords to
corresponding ML frameworks, making it easy to include new
ML frameworks or evaluate the accuracy of keywords(listed
in Appendix A1). Further, ModelXRay supports generic
keywords, such as “NeuralNetwork”,“LSTM”, “CNN”, and
“RNN” to discover unpopular ML frameworks. However, these
generic keywords may cause false positives. We evaluate and
verify the results in §4.3.
ML Model Files: To identify model files, previous work [54]
rely on file suffix match to find models that follow the
common naming schemes. We find, however, many model
files are arbitrarily named. Therefore, We use a hybrid
approach combining file suffix match and path keyword match
(e.g.,../models/arbitrary.name can be a model file). We
address false positives by using three filters: whether the file
size is big enough (more than 8 KB); whether it has a file suffix
that is unlikely for ML models (e.g.,model.jpg); whether the
app has ML libraries.
Encrypted Model Files: We use the standard entropy test
to infer if a model file is encrypted or not. High entropy in a
file is typically resulted from encryption or compression [11].
For compressed files, we rule them out by checking file types
and magic numbers. We use 7.99 as the entropy threshold
for encryption in the range of [0,8], which is the average
entropy of the sampled encrypted model files (see §4.3).
Previous work [54] treats models that cannot be parsed by
ML framework as encrypted models, which is not suitable in
our analysis and has high false positives for several reasons,
such as the lack of a proper parser, customized model formats,
aggregated models, etc.
ML App Profiles: As the output, ModelXRay generates a
profile for each app analyzed. A profile comprises of two parts:
ML models and SDK libraries. For ML models, it records file
names, sizes, MD5 hash and entropy. In particular, the MD5
hashes help us identify shared/reused models among different
apps (as discussed in §4.4).
For SDK libraries, we record framework names, the
exported symbols, and the strings extracted from the binaries.
They contain information about the ML functionalities, such
as OCR, face detection, liveness detection. Our analysis
pipeline uses such information to generate the statistics on the
use of ML libraries (§4.4).
4.3 Accuracy Evaluation of ModelXRay
Accuracy of Identifying ML Apps: To establish the ground
truth for this evaluation, we manually selected and verified 219
ML apps as the true positives. We included 219 non-ML apps
labeled by [54] as the true negatives. We evaluated ModelXRay
on this set of 438 apps. It achieved a false negative rate of 6.8%
(missed 30 ML apps) and a false positive rate of 0% (zero
non-ML apps is classified as ML apps). We checked the 30
missed ML apps, and found out that they are using unpopular
ML Frameworks whose keywords are not in the dictionary.
We found two ML apps that ModelXRay correctly detected
but are missed by [54], one using ULSFaceTracker, which is
an unpopular ML framework and the other using TensorFlow.
To further evaluate the false positive rate, we run Mod-
elXRay on our entire set of 46,753 apps and randomly sampled
100 apps labeled by ModelXRay as ML apps (50 apps from
Google Play and 50 apps from Chinese app market). We
then manually checked these 100 apps and found 3 apps
that are not ML apps (false positive rate of 3%). The manual
check was done by examining the library’s exposed symbols
and functions. This relatively low false positive rate shows
ModelXRay’s high accuracy in detecting ML apps for our
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large-scale study.
Accuracy of Identifying Models: We randomly sampled
100 model files identified by ModelXRay from Chinese app
markets and Google Play, respectively, and manually verified
the results. ModelXRay achieved a true positive rate of 91%
and 97%, respectively.
In order to evaluate how widely apps conform to model
standard naming conventions, we manually checked 100 ML
apps from both Google Play and Chinese app market and
found 24 apps that do not follow any clear naming conventions.
Some use ".tfl" and ".lite" instead of the normal ".tflite" for
TensorFlow Lite models. Some use "3_class_model" without
a suffix. Some have meaningful but not standard suffixes
such as ".rpnmodel",".traineddata". Other have very generic
suffixes such as ".bin", ".dat", and ".bundle". This observation
shows that file suffix matching alone can miss a lot of model
files. Table 1 shows the top 5 popular model file suffixes used
in different app markets. Many of these popular suffixes are
not standard. ModelXRay’s model detection does not solely
depend on model file names.
Table 1: Popular model suffix among different app markets
360 Mobile
Assistant Num.Of.Cases
Google
Play Num.Of.Cases
.bin 1860 .bin 318
.model 1540 .model 175
.rpnmodel 257 .pb 93
.binary 212 .tflite 83
.dat 201 .traineddata 46
Accuracy of Identifying Encrypted Models: To demon-
strate the accuracy of using entropy as indicator of encryption,
we sampled 10 models files each from 4 popular encodings:
ascii text, protobuffer, flatbuffer, and encrypted format.
We calculated their entropy values (Figure 3). Obviously,
encrypted model files all have distinguishably high entropy
close to 8. The other encodings have varying entropy values
but all significant lower than 8. Figure 4 shows the entropy
distribution of all model files that we collected from 360 App
Assistant app market. It shows that typical entropy values of
unencrypted model files stay between 3.5 and 7.5.
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Figure 4: Model File Entropy Distribution of 360 App Market
4.4 Findings and Insights
We now present the results from our analysis as well as our
findings and insights, which provide answers to the question
“Q1: How widely is model protection used in apps?”. We start
with the popularity and diversity of on-device ML among our
collected apps, which echo the importance of model security
and protection. We then compare model protection used in
various apps. Especially, we draw observations on how model
protection varies across different app markets and different
ML frameworks. We also report our findings about the shared
encrypted models used in different apps.
Popularity and Diversity of ML Apps: In total, we are able
to collect 46,753 Android apps from Google Play, Tencent
My App and 360 Mobile Assistant stores. Using ModelXRay,
we identify 1,468 apps that use on-device ML and have ML
models deployed on devices, which accounts for 3.14% of our
entire app collection.
We also measure the popularity of ML apps for each
category, based on the intuition that apps from certain
categories much more heavily use on-device ML than others.
We used the app category information from the three app
markets. Table 2 shows the per-category counts for total apps
and ML apps (i.e., apps using on-device ML). Our findings
are summarized as follows:
On-device ML is gaining popularity in all categories. There
are more than 50 ML apps in each of the categories, which
suggests the widespread interests among app developers in
using on-device ML. Among all the categories, “Business",
“Image" and “News" are the top three that see most ML apps.
This observation confirms the diversity of apps that make
heavy use of on-device ML. It also highlights that a wide range
of apps need to protect their ML models and attackers have
a wide selection of targets.
More apps from Chinese markets are embracing on-device
ML. This is reflected from both the percentage and the absolute
number of ML apps: Google Play has 178 (1.40%), Tencent
My App has 159 (7.25%), and 360 Mobile Assistant has 1,131
(3.55%).
As we can see from the above findings, Chinese app markets
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show a significant higher on-device machine learning adoption
rate and unique property of per-category popularity, making
it a non-negligible dataset for studying on-device machine
learning model protection.
Table 2: The number of apps collected across markets.
Google
Play
Tencent
My App
360
Mobile
Assistant
Total
Category All ML All ML All ML All ML
Business 404 2 99 2 2,450 296 2,953 300
News 96 0 102 5 2,450 180 2,648 185
Images 349 36 158 23 4,900 156 5,407 215
Map 263 4 206 14 2,450 83 2,919 101
Social 438 23 141 17 2,450 79 3,029 119
Shopping 183 5 112 16 2,450 84 2,745 105
Life 1,715 15 193 16 2,450 53 4,358 84
Education 389 3 116 7 2,450 74 2,955 84
Finance 123 6 76 21 2,450 55 2,649 82
Health 317 5 115 3 2,450 42 2,882 50
Other 8,434 79 874 35 4,900 29 14,208 143
Total 12,711 178 2,192 159 31,850 1,131 46,753 1,468
Note: In 360 Mobile Assistant, the number of unique apps is 31,591 (smaller
than 32,850) because some apps are multi-categorized. Image category
contains 4,900 apps because we merged image and photo related apps.
We measure the diversity of ML apps in terms of ML
frameworks and functionalities. We show the top-10 most
common functionalities and their distribution across different
ML frameworks in Table 3.
On-device ML offers highly diverse functionalities. Almost
all common ML functionalities are now offered in the on-
device fashion, including OCR, face tracking, hand detection,
speech recognition, handwriting recognition, ID card recogni-
tion, and bank card recognition, liveness detection, face recog-
nition, iris recognition and so on. This high diversity means
that, from the model theft perspective, attackers can easily find
targets to steal ML models for any common functionalities.
Long tail in the distribution of ML frameworks used in
apps Besides the well-known frameworks such as TensorFlow,
Caffe2/PyTorch, and Parrots, many other ML frameworks are
used for on-device ML, despite their relatively low market
share. For instance, as shown in 3, Tencent NCNN [25], Xi-
aomi Mace [7], Apache MXNet [3], and ULS from Utility
Asset Store [27] are used by a fraction of the apps that we
collected. Each of them tends to cover only a few ML function-
alities. In addition, there could be other unpopular ML frame-
works that our analysis may have missed. This long tail in the
distribution of ML frameworks poses a challenge to model
protection because frameworks use different model formats,
model loading/parsing routines, and model inference pipelines.
Model Protection Across App Stores: Figure 5 gives the
per-app-market statistics on ML model protection and reuse.
Figure 5a shows the per-market numbers of protected apps
(i.e., apps using protected/encrypted models) and unprotected
apps (i.e., apps using unprotected models).
Overall, only 59% of ML apps protect their models. The
rest of the apps (602 in total) simply include the models in
plaintext, which can be easily extracted from the app packages
or installation directories. This result is alarming and suggests
that a large number of app developers are unaware of model
theft risks and fail to protect their models. It also shows that,
for 41% of the ML apps, stealing their models is as easy as
downloading and decompressing their app packages. We urge
stakeholders and security researchers to raise their awareness
and understanding of model thefts, which is a goal of this work.
Percentages of protected models vary across app markets.
When looking closer at each app market, it is obvious to see
that Google Play has the lowest percentage of ML apps using
protected models (26%) whereas 360 Mobile Assistant has
the highest (66%) and Tencent My App follows closely (59%).
These percentages indicate that the apps from the Chinese mar-
kets are more active in protecting their ML models, possibly
due to better security awareness or higher risks [13, 28].
When zooming into apps and focusing on individual models
(i.e., some apps use multiple ML models for different function-
alities), the percentages of unprotected models (Figure 5b) be-
come even higher. Overall, 4254 out of 6522 models (77%) are
unprotected and thus easily extractable and reverse engineered.
Model Protection Across ML Frameworks: We also derive
the per-ML-framework statistics on model protection (Figure
6). The frameworks used by a relatively small number apps,
including MXNet, Mace, TFLite, and ULS, are grouped into
the “Other" category.
Models on more popular ML frameworks have wider
adoption of protection, but still not wide enough. As shows
in Figure 6a, more than 79% of the apps using SenseTime
(Parrots) have protected models, followed by apps using Caffe
(60% of them have protected models). For apps using Tensor-
Flow and NCNN, the number is around 20%. Apps using other
frameworks are the least protected against model thefts. This
result can be partly explained by the fact that some popular
frameworks, such as SenseTime, has first-party or third-party
libraries that provide the model encryption feature. However,
even for apps using the top-4 ML frameworks, the percentage
of ML apps adopting model protection is still low at 59%.
Encrypted Models Reused/Shared among Apps: Our
analysis also reveals a common practice used in developing
on-device ML apps, which has profound security implications.
We found that many encrypted models are reused or shared
by different apps. The most widely shared model, namely
SenseID_Motion_Liveness.model, is found in 81 apps,
most of which are unrelated. We confirm that most of these
cases are legitimate and resulted from a trend in on-device ML,
whereby app developers buy and use ML models and services
from third-party providers, such as SenseTime, instead of
developing their own ML features. Apps using the same ML
functionality provided by the same vendor often contain the
same ML model. Moreover, most of these models are en-
crypted, which reflects professional ML providers’ awareness
of model theft risks and their efforts to mitigate them.
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Table 3: Number of apps using different ML Frameworks with different functionalities.
Functionality
TensorFlow
(Google)
*Caffe2/PyTorch
(Facebook)
*Parrots
(SenseTime)
TFLite
(Google)
NCNN
(Tencent)
Mace
(Xiaomi)
MxNet
(Apache)
ULS (Utility
Asset Store) Total
OCR(Optical Character Recognition) 41 186 140 6 37 18 1 11 441
Face Tracking 26 272 216 7 53 6 13 27 620
Speech Recognition 7 32 9 1 11 18 1 9 88
Hand Detection 4 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 10
Handwriting Recognition 8 17 1 0 16 0 0 0 42
Liveness Detection 32 392 349 9 70 7 10 3 872
Face Recognition 17 116 95 6 40 7 10 3 294
Iris Recognition 0 4 0 0 2 0 3 0 9
ID Card Recognition 26 230 147 5 47 18 0 10 483
Bank Card Recognition 11 126 117 2 16 18 0 9 299
Note: 1) One app may use multiple frameworks for different ML functionalities. Therefore, the sum of apps using different functionalities is bigger than the number of total apps. 2)
Security critical functionalities are in bold fonts and can be used for fraud detection or access control. 3) *Caffe was initially developed by Berkeley, based on which Facebook built
Caffe2, which was later merged with PyTorch. The following uses “Caffe” to represent Caffe, Caffe2 and PyTorch.
(a) Apps using protected
models vs. those using unprotected models
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Figure 5: Statistics on ML model protection and reuse, grouped by app markets. The “total” number of unique models is less than the sum of the per-store numbers
because some models are not unique from different stores.
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Figure 6: Statistics on ML model protection and reuse, grouped by ML frameworks. The “total” number is less than the sum of the per-framework numbers
because many apps use multiple frameworks for different functionalities.
It is common to see the same encrypted model shared by
different apps. For all the encrypted models that we detected
from the apps, we calculate their MD5 hashes and identify
those models that are used in different and unrelated apps.
Figures 5c and 6c show the numbers of unique (or non-shared)
models and reused (or shared) models, grouped by app markets
and ML frameworks, respectively. Overall, only 22% of all
the protected models are unique. 75% of the encrypted models
from Google Play are unique whereas only 50% and 19% of
the encrypted models on Tencent My App and 360 Mobile As-
sistant, respectively, are not reused (Figure 5c). When grouped
by ML frameworks, 82% of encrypted SenseTime models are
shared, the highest among all frameworks (Figure 6c).
The security implication of widely shared encrypted models
is two folds. First, the protection of the shared models is not
only the responsibility of the SDK providers, but also the
responsibility of all the app developers, and the app users.
Second, it is challenging to attribute a leaked model to a
certain app because multiple apps use the same model.
GPU Acceleration Adoption Rate among ML Apps: Table
4 shows the number ML apps and libraries that use GPU for
acceleration. 797(54%) ML apps make use of GPU. The wide
adoption of GPU acceleration poses a challenge to the design
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of secure on-device ML. For instance, the naive idea of perform-
ing model inference and other model access operations entirely
inside a trusted execution environment (TEE, e.g., TrustZone)
is not viable due to the need for GPU acceleration, which can-
not be easily or efficiently accessed within the TEE.
Table 4: ML apps and libraries that use GPU acceleration
360 Mobile
Assistant
Tencent
My App
Google
Play
ML Apps 669 104 24
ML Libraries 212 103 23
5 Q2: How Robust Are Existing Model Protec-
tion Techniques?
To answer this question, we build ModelXtractor, a tool simple
by design to dynamically recover protected or encrypted
models used in on-device ML. Conceptually, ModelXtractor
represents a practical and unsophisticated attack, whereby
an attacker installs apps on his or her own mobile device and
uses the off-the-shelf app instrumentation tools to identify
and export ML models loaded in the memory. ModelXtractor
mainly targets on-device ML models that are encrypted during
transportation and at rest (in storage) but not protected when
in use or loaded in memory. For protected models mentioned
in §4, ModelXtractor is performed to assess the robustness
of the protection.
The workflow of ModelXtractor is depicted in Figure 7.
It takes inputs from ModelXRay, including the information
about the ML framework(s) and the model(s) used in the
app (described in §4). These information helps to target and
efficiently instrument an app during runtime, and capture
models in plaintext from the memory of the app. We discuss
ModelXtractor’s code instrumentation strategies in §5.1, our
techniques for recognizing in-memory models in §5.2, and
how ModelXtractor verifies captured models in §5.3. Our
findings, insights, the answer to Q2, and several case studies
are presented in §5.4 and §5.5.
5.1 App Instrumentation
ModelXtractor uses app instrumentation to dynamically find
the memory buffers where (decrypted) ML is loaded and ac-
cessed by the ML frameworks. For each app, ModelXtractor de-
termines which libraries and functions need to be instrumented
and when to start and stop each instrumentation,based on the in-
strumentation strategies (discussed shortly). ModelXtractor au-
tomatically generates the code that needs to be inserted at differ-
ent instrumentation points. It employs the widely used Android
instrumentation tool, Frida [10], to perform code injection.
ModelXtractor has a main instrumentation strategy (S0)
and four alternative ones (S1-S4). When the default strategy
cannot capture the models, the alternatively strategies (S1-S4)
will be used.
S0: Capture at Model Deallocation: This is the default
strategy since we observe the most convenient time and place
to capture an in-memory model is right before the deallocation
of the buffer where the model is loaded. This is because (1)
memory deallocation APIs (e.g.,free) are limited in numbers
and easy to instrument, and (2) models are completely loaded
and decrypted when their buffers are to be freed.
Naive instrumentation of deallocation APIs can lead to dra-
matic app slowdown. We optimize it by first only activating it af-
ter the ML library is loaded, and second, only for buffers greater
than the minimum model size (a configurable threshold). To
get buffer size, memory allocation APIs (e.g.,malloc) are in-
strumented as well. The size information also helps correlate
a decrypted model to its encrypted version (discussed in §5.3).
This default instrumentation strategy may fail in the
following uncommon scenarios. First, an app is not using
native ML libraries, but a JavaScript ML library. Second, an
app uses its own or customized memory allocator/deallocator.
Third, a model buffer is not freed during our dynamic analysis.
S1: Capture from Heap: This strategy dumps the entire heap
region of an app when a ML functionality is in use, in order to
identify possible models in it. It is suitable for apps that do not
free model buffers timely or at all. It also helps in cases where
memory-managed ML libraries are used (e.g., JavaScript) and
buffer memory deallocations (done by a garbage collector)
are implicit or delayed.
S2: Capture at Model Loading: This strategy instruments
ML framework APIs that load models to buffers. We manually
collect a list of such APIs (e.g., loadModel) for the ML
frameworks observed in our analysis. This strategy is suitable
for those apps where S0 fails and the ML framework code is
not obfuscated.
S3: Capture at Model Decryption: This strategy instruments
model decryption APIs (e.g., aes256_decrypt) in ML frame-
works, which we we collected manually. Similar to S2, it is not
applicable to apps that use obfuscated ML framework code.
S4: Capture at Customized Deallocation: Some apps use
customized memory deallocators. We manually identify a
few such allocators (e.g., slab_free), which are instrumented
similarly as S0.
5.2 Model Representation and Recognition
The app instrumentation described earlier captures memory
buffers that may contain ML models. The next step is to
perform model recognition from the buffers. The recognition is
based on the knowledge of in-memory model representations,
i.e., different ML frameworks use different formats model
encoding, discussed in the following.
Protobuf is the most popular model encoding format, used
by TensorFlow, Caffe, NCNN, and SenseTime. To detect and
extract models in Protobuf from memory buffers, ModelX-
tractor uses two kinds of signatures: content signatures and
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Figure 7: Extraction of (decrypted) models from app memory using ModelXtractor
The left side shows the typical workflow of model loading and decryption in mobile apps. The
right side shows the workflow of ModelXtractor. The same color on both sides indicate the same timing of the strategy being used. The "Check
SDK License" shows that a model provider will check an app’s SDK license before releasing the decryption keys as a way to protect its IP.
encoding signatures. The former is used to identify buffers that
contain models and the latter is used to locate the beginning
of a model in a buffer.
Model encoded in Protobuf usually contains words descrip-
tive of neural network structures and layers. For example,
“conv1" is used for one-dimension convolution layer,and “relu"
for the Rectified Linear Unit. Such descriptive words appear
in almost every model and are used as the content signatures.
The encoding signatures of Protobuf is derived from its
encoding rule [24]. For example, a Protobuf contains multiple
messages. Every message is a series of key-value pairs, or
fields. The key of a field is encoded as (field_number  3)
| wire_type, where the field_number is the ID of the field
and wire_type specifies the field type.
A typical model in Protobuf starts with a message whose
first field defines the model name (e.g.,VGG_CNN_S). This field
usually has a wire_type of 2 (i.e., a length-delimited string)
and a field_number of 0 (i.e., the first field), which means
that encoded key for this field is “0A”. This key is usually the
first byte of a Protobuf encoded model. Due to alignment, this
key appears at a four-byte aligned address within the buffer.
It is used as an encoding signature.
Other model formats and representations have their own
content and encoding signature. For example, TFLite models
usually include "TFL2" or “TFL3" as version numbers. Some
model files are even stored in JSON format, with easily identi-
fiable names for each field. Models from unknown frameworks
or of unknown encoding formats are hard to identify from mem-
ory. In such cases, we consider the buffer of the same size as the
encrypted model to contain the decrypted model. This buffer-
model size matching turns out to be fairly reliable in practice.
The reason is that, when implementing a decryption routine,
programmers almost always allocate a buffer for holding the
decrypted content with the same size as the encrypted content.
This practice is both convenient (i.e., no need to precisely calcu-
late the buffer size before decryption) and safe (i.e., decrypted
content is always shorter than its encrypted counterpart due to
the use of IV and padding during encryption). We show how
buffer size matching is used in our case studies in §5.5.
5.3 Evaluation of ModelXtractor
Model Verification: ModelXtractor performs a two-step
verification to remove falsely extracted models. First, it
confirms that the extracted model is valid. Second, it verifies
that the extracted model matches the encrypted model. We
use publicly available model parsers to verify the validity of
extracted model buffers (e.g., protobuf decoder [21] to extract
protobuf content, and Netron [19] to show the model structure).
When a decoding or parsing error happens, ModelXtractor
considers the extracted model invalid and reports a failed
model extraction attempt. To confirm that an extracted model
indeed corresponds to the encrypted model, ModelXtractor
uses the buffer-model size matching described before.
Evaluation on Apps from Google Play: There are 47 ML
apps from Google Play that use encryption to protect their
models. We applied ModelXtractor on half of the ML apps
(randomly selected 23 out of 47). Among the tested 23
apps, we successfully extracted decrypted models from 9 of
them. As for the other 14 apps, 2 apps do not use encryption,
1 app does not using ML, and 11 apps do not have their
models extracted for the following reasons: apps cannot be
instrumented; apps did not trigger the ML function; apps
cannot be installed on our test devices.
Evaluation on Apps from Chinese App Markets: There
are 819 apps from Chinese app markets found to be using
encrypted models, where model reuse is quite common as
shown in our static analysis. We carefully selected 59 of these
apps prioritizing model popularity and app diversity. Our
analyzed apps cover 15 of the top 45 most widely used models
(i.e., each is reused more than 10 times) and 8 app categories.
When analyzing the Chinese apps, we encountered some
non-technical difficulties of navigating the apps and triggering
their ML functionalities. For instance, some apps require
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phone numbers from certain regions that we could not obtain
for user registration. A lot of them are online P2P loan apps or
banking apps that require a local bank account to trigger ML
functionalities. Out of the 59 apps, we managed to successfully
navigate and trigger ML functionalities in 16 apps. We then
extracted decrypted models from 9 of them.
Limitation of ModelXtractor: ModelXtractor failed to
extract 11 models whose ML functionalities were indeed
triggered. This was because of the limitation of our instru-
mentation strategies discussed in §5.1. We note that these
strategies and the design of ModelXtractor are not meant
to extract every protected model. Instead, they represent a
fairly practical and simple attack, designed only to reveal the
insufficient protection of ML models in today’s mobile apps.
5.4 Findings and Insights
Results of Dynamic Model Extraction: Table 5 shows the
statistics on the 82 analyzed apps, grouped by the ML frame-
works they use. Among the 29 apps whose ML functionalities
were triggered, we successfully extracted models from 18
of them (66%). Considering the reuse of those extracted
encrypted models, the number of apps that are affected by
our model extraction is 347 (i.e., 347 apps used the same
models and same protection techniques as the 18 apps that we
extracted models from). This extraction rate is alarming and
shows that a majority of the apps using model protection can
still lose their valuable models to an unsophisticated attack.
It indicates that even for app developers and ML providers
willing/trying to protect their models, it is hard to do it in a
robust way using the file encryption-based techniques.
Table 6 shows the per-app details about the extracted models.
We anonymized the apps for security concerns: many of
them are highly downloaded apps or provide security-critical
services. Many of the listed apps contain more than one ML
models. For simplicity, we only list one representative model
for each app.
Most decrypted models in memory are not protected at all.
As shown in Table 6, most of the decrypted models (12 of
15) were easily captured using the default strategy (S0) when
model buffers are to be freed. This means that the decrypted
models may remain in memory for an extended period of time
(i.e., decrypted models are not erased before memory dealloca-
tion), which creates a large time window for model thefts for
leakages. Moreover, this result indicates that apps using encryp-
tion to protect models are not doing enough to secure decrypted
models loaded in memory, partly due to the lack practical in-
memory data protection techniques on mobile platforms.
Popularity and Diversity of Extracted Models: The
extracted models are highly popular and diverse, some very
valuable or security-critical. From Table 6 we can see that 8
of 15 listed apps have been downloaded more than 10 million
times. Half of the extracted models belong to commercial
ML providers, such as SenseTime, and were purchased by the
app developers. Such models being leaked may cause direct
financial loss to both app developers and model owners (§6).
As for diversity, the model size ranges from 160KB to
20MB. They span all the popular frameworks, such as
TensorFlow, TFLite, Caffe, SenseTime, Baidu, and Face++.
The observed model formats include Protobuf, FlatBuffer,
JSON, and some proprietary formats used by SenseTime,
Face++ and Baidu. In terms of ML functionalities, the models
are used for face recognition, face tracking, liveness detection,
OCR, ID/card recognition, photo processing, and malware
detection. Among them, liveness detection, malware detection,
and face recognition are often used for security-critical
purposes, such as access control and fraud detection. Leakage
of these models may give attackers an advantage to develop
model evasion techniques in a white-box fashion.
Potential Risk of Leaking SDK/Model License: SDK/-
Model license are poorly protected. Developers who bought
the ML SDK license from model provider usually ship the
license along with app package. During analysis, we find
the license are used to verify legal use of SDK before model
file get decrypted. However, license file are not protected by
the developer, which means it is possible to illegally use the
SDK by stealing license file directly from those apps that have
bought it. Poor protection of license has been observed in both
SenseTime ML SDKs and some other SDKs, which actually
affects hundreds of different apps.
Table 5: Model extraction statistics.
ML
Framework
Unique Models
Analyzed
ML
Triggered
Models
Extracted
Models
Missed
Apps
Affected
TensorFlow 3 3 3 0 3
Caffe 7 3 1 2 79
SenseTime 55 16 11 5 186
TFLite 3 2 2 0 76
NCNN 9 3 0 3 0
Other 5 3 2 1 88
Total 82 29 18 11 347
Note: 347 is the sum of affected apps per framework after deduplication.
5.5 Interesting Cases of Model Protection
We observe a few cases clearly showing that some model
providers use extra protection on their models. Below we
discuss these cases and share our insights.
Encrypting Both Code and Model Files: Anyline is a popu-
lar OCR SDK provider. It licenses its SDK and models to apps
that need OCR functionalities. We analyzed an app that use
Anyline. From the app profile generated by ModelXRay, we
can tell that the app uses TensorFlow framework with the Any-
line models. It places the encrypted models under a directory
named “encrypted_models”. Initially, ModelXtractor failed
to extract the decrypted models using the default strategy (S0).
We manually investigated the reason and found that, unlike
most ML apps, this app runs ML inference in a customized
WebView, where an encrypted JavaScript, dynamically loaded
at runtime, performs the model decryption and inference.
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Table 6: Overview of Successfully Dumped Models with ModelXtractor
App name Downloads Framework Model Functionality Size (B) Format Reuses Extraction Strategy
Anonymous App 1 300M TFLite Liveness Detection 160K FlatBuffer 18 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 2 10M Caffe Face Tracking 1.5M Protobuf 4 Model Loading
Anonymous App 3 27M SenseTime Face Tracking 2.3M Protobuf 77 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 4 100K SenseTime Face Filter 3.6M Protobuf 3 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 5 100M SenseTime Face Filter 1.4M Protobuf 2 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 6 10K TensorFlow OCR 892K Protobuf 2 Memory Dumping
Anonymous App 7 10M TensorFlow Photo Process 6.5M Protobuf 1 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 8 10K SenseTime Face Track 1.2M Protobuf 5 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 9 5.8M Caffe Face Detect 60K Protobuf 77 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 10 10M Face++ Liveness 468K Unknown 17 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 11 100M SenseTime Face Detect 1.7M Protobuf 18 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 12 492K Baidu Face Tracking 2.7M Unknown 26 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 13 250K SenseTime ID card 1.3M Unknown 13 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 14 100M TFLite Camera Filter 228K Json 1 Freed Buffer
Anonymous App 15 5K TensorFlow Malware Classification 20M Protobuf 1 Decryption Buffer
Note: 1) We excluded some apps that dumped the same models as reported above; 2) We anonymized
the name of the apps to protect the user’s security; 3) Every app has several models for different functionalities, we only list one representative model for each app.
We analyzed the heap memory dumped by ModelXtractor
using the alternative strategy, S1. We searched for potential
model buffers and found the TensorFlow model buffers in
the memory dump. We verified our findings by decoding the
Protobuf model buffers and extract the models’ weights.
This interesting case shows that, despite the extra protection
and the sophisticated obfuscation, the app can still lose its
models to not-so-advanced attacks that can locate and extract
decrypted models in app memory.
Encrypting Feature Vectors and Formats: We encountered
one malware detection app, which does not encrypt its model
file, but instead encrypts the feature vectors. This app uses
a Random Forest model for malware classification. It uses
TensorFlow and the model is in the Protobuf format. There
are more than one thousand features used in this malware
classification model, like the APIs used by the App or the
Permissions claimed in the Android Manifest files. By
encrypting the feature vectors, its developer assumes it is
impossible to (re)use the model because the input format and
content are unknown to attackers. However, we instrumented
the decryption functions and extracted decrypted feature
vectors. With this information, an attacker can steal and
recover the model as well as the feature vector format, which
can lead to model evasions or bypassing the malware detection.
Encrypting Models Multiple Times: Another type of extra
model protection we observed was in an app that encrypts its
models multiple times. This app is a financial app that offers on-
line P2P loans. It uses two models provided by SenseTime: one
for ID card recognition and one for liveness detection to fraud,
which are security critical. ModelXtractor captured 6 model
buffers successfully, whose sizes range from 200KB to 800KB.
However, we only found 2 encrypted model files. When we
were trying to map the dumped model buffers to the encrypted
files, we found something very interesting. One encrypted
model file named SenseID_Ocr_Idcard_Mobile_1.0.1.model
has a size of 1.3 MB. Among the dumped model buffers, we
have one buffer of the same size. It is supposed to be the de-
crypted buffer of the encrypted file. After analyzing its content,
we found that it is actually a tar file containing multiple files,
one of which is align_back.model. After inspecting the content
of align_back.model, we found that it is also an encrypted file.
We then found another buffer of exactly the same size, 246 KB,
which contains a decrypted model. We finally realized that
the app encrypts each model individually and then compresses
all encrypted models into a tar file, which is encrypted again.
6 Q3: How Much Can (Stolen) Models Cost?
ML models are the core intellectual properties of ML
solution providers. The impacts of leaked models are wide
and profound. First, designing and training models usually
requires a large amount computing and human resources.
Second, models leaked to competitors can weaken model
owners’ competitive edge and adversely affect their pricing
strategy. Third, leaking critical models can result in security
and privacy breaches. With access to private models, attackers
can create adversarial inputs, for example, to bypass the model
used in face/fingerprint/iris recognition. All these impacts of
leaked models can translate to financial loss.
In this section, we qualitatively estimate the potential
financial loss caused by leaked ML models. There are two
common sources of models. Type-I: app developers buy an ML
SDK and model license from an ML solution provider, such as
SenseTime, Face++, and so on. Type-II: app developers design
and train their own ML models using open-source or cus-
tomized frameworks. The following discussion is focused on
Type-I models because it is more popular among commercial
models and the analysis for Type-II can be derived from Type-I.
6.1 Breakdown of Financial Impact
Research and Development Cost: The R&D cost of ML
models comes from three sources: collecting and labeling data
11
for training, hiring AI engineers for designing and fine-tuning
models, and computing resources, such as renting Amazon
SageMaker or buying and maintaining GPU clusters for
training models. With simplification, the R&D cost can be
formulated as follows:
CostR&D =CostData+CostHR+CostMachine (1)
Data labelling can be outsourced and its pricing can be
estimated base on public data online. The data collection cost
varies case by case, depending on the nature of the data and
source. CostHR can be estimated based on the annual salary
paid to AI engineers, multiplied by the duration of model
development. Similarly, CostMachine can be estimated based
on the rates of renting storage servers and GPU clusters.
Financial Loss to Competition: The impact of models
leaked to competitors can be reflected in potential revenue
loss caused by the reduction of customers, market share, or
product price due to lost competitive edge. All stakeholders,
including ML solution providers and app developers (model
license subscribers), are affected. We estimate the competition
loss with the following formula:
CostCompete =∑(RStakeholderX×HCompeteX ) (2)
where HCompeteX is the competition impact factor for Stake-
holder X, ranging from 0 to 1. RStakeholderX is the revenue of
stakeholder X. Intuitively, CostCompete is the revenue lost to all
competitors due to a leaked model. For an SDK model provider,
its revenue can be considered as the accumulation of license
fee for each customer.
Financial Loss to Model Evasion: On-device ML has been
used widely in access control, e.g., face, fingerprint, and
iris recognition, which are security critical. The leakage of
such critical models can greatly facilitate attackers to craft
adversarial inputs to pass the security checks. We estimate the
financial loss from model evasion using the following formula:
CostSecurity =∑(RStakeHolderX×HSecurityX ) (3)
where HSecurityX means the security impact factor on stake-
holder X, ranging from 0 to 1.
6.2 Case Study of Financial Loss Estimation
We choose the following apps for this study (anonymized for
security reasons): Translate App A, Bank App B, Bank App
C, and E-Commerce App D [18]. These apps are chosen for
their diversity in model complexity, functionality, popularity
and model providers. The popularity of model (reuse rate)
ranges from 1 to 68, and the models are provided by different
providers like Baidu, Face++, and SenseTime. The model size
ranges from 508KB to 3.1MB, they cover functionalities such
as OCR, liveness, bank card detection, etc.
Table 7 shows the estimated financial loss of model leakage
from the four apps mentioned above. We estimated the amount
of resources, e.g., engineering team size and number of servers,
based on the five-point Likert scale [43], and the impact fac-
tors, e.g., HCompeteX , HSecurityX , based on the three-point Likert
scale. The scale categorization details can be found in the Ap-
pendix at Table B1. We use the public pricing of Amazon Sage-
Maker [16] to calculate the cost for data collection, labeling,
GPU, and storage. We use Paysa [14] for estimating AI engi-
neer salaries and use Crunchbase [9] for collecting revenue and
competition information. We give higher security impact factor
when the model is security critical, e.g. liveness detection.
Financial Impact on Model Providers: For model providers,
their revenue comes from licensing their models to app
developers. They are the one who invest on developing the
models. The financial impact on them is largely affected by
their R&D cost and their revenue loss due to possible customer
loss after model leakage.
Leakage of popular and security critical models may cause
much more financial loss to model providers. From Table 7, we
can see that the financial loss can be as high as $1,246,000 for
SenseTime in the case of E-Commerce App D when a popular
model used by 68 apps is stolen. The lowest loss is $464,000,
still fairly high, in the case of Translate App A, whose model
is only used by one app.
Financial Impact on App Developers: For developers, they
do not have direct R&D cost in developing ML models. Their
loss comes mainly from the license fee they paid to the model
provider. The financial loss to competition comes when their
competitors use a leaked model at a lower or zero price. This
loss can be bounded and is also reflected in the license fee. So
we do not consider an extra financial loss to competition in
addition to the license fee for app developer. If the model is
security critical, their revenue are further affected due to user’s
security concern; otherwise, we do not consider the financial
loss to security.
Machine learning used in security critical case is a double-
edged sword to app developer. From Table 7, we can see that
the financial loss can be as high as $18,100,000 in the case of
E-Commerce App D, when the model is security critical and
the company has high revenue. The model here is used to verify
whether it is a real human holding a real ID card. It is a good
example showing that when ML is used for security-critical pur-
poses, they can bring in great convenience and security risks at
the same time. For example, users do not need to go to customer
service centers to verify their identities; however, if the ML
models are leaked, the security check may be easily bypassed.
7 Discussion
Research Insights: White-box Adversarial Machine Learning.
Previous research on adversarial machine learning has been
focused on black-box threat models, assuming the model files
are inaccessible. Our research shows that an attacker can easily
extract the protected private models. As a result, more research
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Table 7: Financial Loss Estimation Examples
App
Name
Model
Size (B)
Reuse
Times
SDK
Information Functionality
Model Provider App Developer TotalR&D Competition Evasion License Competition Evasion
Translate App A 2.7M 1 Baidu OCR $454,000 $10,000 - $100,000 - - $564,000
Bank App B 508K 2 Face++ Liveness $228,000 $20,000 $40,000 $100,000 - $ 3,600,000 $3,988,000
Bank App C 3.1M 15 SenseTime Bank card $424,000 $75,000 - $100,000 - - $599,000
E-Commerce App D 644K 68 SenseTime Liveness $226,000 $340,000 $680,000 $100,000 - $18,000,000 $19,346,000
Note: We anonymized the real name of the apps, only show their categories.
on defending adversarial machine learning under white-box
threat model is much needed to improve the resiliency of those
models used in security critical applications.
Model Plagiarism Detection. As machine learning models
are not well protected, attackers, instead of training their own
model, can steal their competitor’s model and reuse it. As a
result, model plagiarism detection is needed to prevent this
type of attack. It is challenging because the attacker can retrain
their model based on the stolen one, making it looks very
different. We need research to detect model plagiarism and
provide forensic tools for illegal model reuse analysis.
Limitations: Since the goal of this paper is to show that even
simple tools can extract on-device ML models in a large scale,
ModelXRay and ModelXtractor are limited by the straightfor-
ward design of keyword matching. We acknowledge that the
scale of model extraction can be further improved by leveraging
program slicing and partial execution [34,44], and Android app
de-obfuscation [32, 53]. Further, model encoding and content
features are limited to well-known ML SDKs having documen-
tation available, thereby we believe an extended knowledge
base can further include special model encoding formats.
We note that our financial loss analysis is subjective and lim-
ited by the asymmetric information of R&D cost and company
revenue. The approach is used to emphasize the point that costs
can be very high. A more comprehensive study can be carried
out by stakeholders having real data of model leakage cases.
8 Related Work
Motivated by hardware acceleration and efficiency improve-
ment of deep neural networks [40], on-device model inference
becomes a new trend [54]. This work empirically evaluates
model security on mobile devices. It interacts with three lines
of research: machine learning model extraction, adversarial
machine learning, and proprietary model protection.
Prior work on machine learning model extraction focuses
on learning-based techniques targeting ML-as-a-service.
Tramer et. al proposes stealing machine learning models
via prediction APIs [50], since ML-as-a-service may accept
partial feature vectors as inputs and include confidence values
with predictions. Then, Wang et. al [52] extend the attacks by
stealing hyperparameters. Other work includes stealing the
functionality of the models [36, 42], querying the gradient to
reconstruct the models [41], exploratory attacks to reverse engi-
neer the classifiers [45], and side channel attacks to recover the
models [31]. Our work is orthogonal to these study by targeting
on-device model inference, assuming the attackers having
physical access to the mobile devices running model inference.
Model extraction paves the road for adversarial machine
learning. Prior work [35, 39] fooling the models or bypassing
the check is mostly under the black-box threat model. Once
ML models become white-box, attackers can easily craft
adversarial examples to deceive the learning systems. Our
study shows white-box adversarial machine learning is a real
threat to on-device ML models.
To secure machine learning training and inference, research
effort has been spent to prevent model information leakage and
unauthorized uses. Graviton [51] is proposed to make GPU a
trusted execution environment with minimal hardware changes
incurred. Slalom [49] uses hardware enclaves, e.g. SGX, dur-
ing model inference and applies homomorphic encryption to
outsource the computation of linear layers to GPU securely.
Privado [48] uses SGX to mitigate side channel attacks of input
inference. TensorScone [38] also uses SGX to protect model
inference but does not include GPU. So far, research in this area
focuses on cloud end security. Our work shows that model se-
curity on mobile device is worrisome and research on hardware
backed model protection for mobile devices is in need. To pro-
tect the model as an intellectual property, watermark technique
has been used to detect illegitimate model uses [30, 55]. More-
over, fingerprinting has been used to protect model integrity.
Chen et al. encodes fingerprint [33] in DNN weights so that the
models can be attested to make sure it is not tampered or mod-
ified. Our research supports it with the finding that model pla-
giarism is a realistic problem especially for mobile platforms.
9 Conclusion
We carry out a large scale security analysis of machine
learning model protection on 46,753 Android apps from both
the Chinese and the US app markets. Our analysis shows
that on-device machine learning is gaining popularity in
every category of mobile apps, however, 41% of them are not
protecting their models. For those are, many suffer from weak
protection mechanisms, such as using the same encrypted
model for multiple apps, and even the encrypted models can
be easily recovered with our unsophisticated analysis. Our
financial loss analysis shows that model leakage can cost
as high as millions of dollars, indicating that attackers both
technically can and financially are motivated to steal models.
We call for research into robust model protection.
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Appendix A Keywords for Different ML
Frameworks
Table A1: ML Framework Keywords
Framework Magic
Words
Framework Magic
Words
TensorFlow tensorflow Caffe caffe
MXnet mxnet NCNN ncnn
Mace libmace,
mace_input
SenseTime sensetime,
st_mobile
ULS ulstracker,
ulsface
Other neuralnetwork,
lstm, cnn,
rnn
Note: “TensorFlow Lite” and “TensorFlow” are merged into one framework,
we handle “TensorFlow Lite” separately with magic word “tflite” in the
“TensorFlow” category.
Appendix B Financial Loss Estimation Details
We calculate the loss factors based on a set of model metadata,
listed in Table B1. The size of storage and number of labels
depend on the type of input dataset of the model. We categorize
the types to text, image, audio, and video. The input dataset size
and number of labels within each category are estimated base
on the mean of well researched public datasets [15, 20, 22, 37].
The number of engineers and GPUs needed are estimated based
on our model development experience, and the team structure
suggested by Business Science [6]. We consider model sizes
of small, medium-small, medium, medium-large, and large,
as less than 1MB, 1MB to 5MB, 5MB to 10MB, 10MB to
20MB, and bigger than 20MB, respectively. These numbers
are chosen based on our observation that on-device model file
size usually ranges from 4KB to 25MB. For the percentage of
company’s revenue that will be affected by the application of
AI, we assume 1% will be affected based on BCG’s estimation
on banking apps [4]. Hcompetition is in range [0,1] and increases
with the number of competitors. We chose low, medium, and
high to represent Hcompetition, and the corresponding numbers
1%, 5% and 10% are chosen to represent the decrease of market
share because of competition [17]. Given that one company
usually has fewer than 10 competitors [9], low, medium, and
high are categorized as the numbers of competitors fewer
than 2, 3 to 5, and more than 5, respectively. Hsecurity is
represented by minor, moderate, and critical [23, 47], and the
corresponding numbers are chosen based on the fee of Equifax
data breach settlement (10% revenue) [12]. We consider model
with functionalities such as face detect, hand detect, OCR,
bank card and ID card recognition, handwriting recognition as
minor, liveness detection, IRIS and face recognition as critical.
To simplify the calculation, we chose the following setting
for our estimation: $186,000 yearly salary per engineer [14],
$0.04 per label [2], $10,000 per GPU and $500 per storage
machine for one year rental.
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Table B1: Model Metadata and Financial Loss Estimation
Metadata Loss factor Description of loss value estimation
Data type data storage Text: 984MB, Image: 160GB, Audio: 280GB, Video: 1TB# of labels Text: 800,000, Image: 750,000, Audio: 1,000,000, Video: 1,000,000
Model size # of engineers Small: 1, Medium-small: 2, Medium: 3, Medium-large: 4, Large: 5# of GPUs Small: 1, Medium-small: 2, Medium: 3, Medium-large: 4, Large: 5
App name Revenue Query Crunchbase with app nameHcompetition Low: 1%, Medium: 5%, High: 10%
SDK information
License fee Query SDK provider website
Reuse times From our calculation
Hcompetition Low: 1%, Medium: 5%, High: 10%
Functionality Hsecurity Minor: 1%, Moderate: 5%, Critical: 10%
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